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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Juan E. Mgndez*
I am very grateful to Rutgers Law School for the invitation to
speak at this important conference. It is a great pleasure to be here
this afternoon in the company of such distinguished panelists and a
committed audience.
My presentation concentrates on the importance of the preven-
tion of mass violence and international crimes, including genocide,
and I will present mainly from the perspectives of the International
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) programs in several countries,
and also from my experience between 2004 and 2007 as the Special
Adviser to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Pre-
vention of Genocide.1
Breaking the cycle of impunity and fostering accountability are
crucial components in the prevention of future violence and mass
atrocities: no prevention efforts can take place without a serious at-
tempt to break the cycle of impunity for past human rights viola-
tions, especially if they are so widespread or systematic as to consti-
tute war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. If perpetra-
tors feel shielded from prosecution or investigation for the crimes
they already committed, they have an incentive not only to commit
them anew, but also to raise the stakes and perpetrate even more se-
rious crimes. Failure to do justice to the victims usually leads to sen-
timents of revenge, and thus, to the likelihood that more crimes will
occur. Accountability is essential not only to halt the vicious cycle of
revenge, but also to enable the victims to make their own decisions as
to their protection and well-being, so that they are not merely passive
recipients of the international community's efforts. Finally, accoun-
tability for past crimes is also important so that the victims, their
families, and their communities can distinguish between their victi-
* Keynote Speaker. President of the International Center for Transitional Jus-
tice and Former Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Geno-
cide. The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of his ICTJ colleagues, Ma-
rieke Wierda, Cecile Aptel, and Richard Bailey, and of his former colleagues at the
United Nations, Ekkehard Strauss and Andres Salazar.
1. See Press Release, Sec'y-Gen., Juan E. M~ndez of Arg. Appointed Special Ad-
viser on Prevention of Genocide, U.N. Doc. SG/A/880 (July 14, 2004),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2004/sga880.doc.htm.
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mizers and the communities they claimed to represent and that the
blame for the atrocities is not placed on innocent descendants of
those perpetrators.
It must be understood, however, that prevention of genocide will
require more and different measures; bringing the perpetrators to
justice will not be enough. Prevention of genocide will require early
warning and reasonable suggestions for early action. The office I held
for thirty months at the request of Secretary-General Kofi Annan
was the first attempt by the United Nations to apply lessons learned
and to correct the structural weaknesses that led the United Nations
to prevent genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s.2
As a very preliminary observation, my experience demonstrates
that early warning and early action can serve important purposes.
Still, the bottleneck is the political will to act that is almost never
present from the start. In that sense, the role of the Special Advisor
was primarily directed to contribute to shape and to create that polit-
ical will, in conjunction with public opinion, caring institutions, and
willing democratic states. I am also glad to report that, following a
strong report from the Advisory Committee on Prevention of Geno-
cide, of which I continue to be a member, the new Secretary-General
has appointed a full-time Special Representative and named the dis-
tinguished jurist Francis Deng to the post.3 In addition to his full-
time duties, he has been assigned more resources and his job has
been elevated to the rank of Under-Secretary-General.4 The latter is
crucial to ensure direct contact with Mr. Ban and through him to the
Security Council, since the latter is-through its Resolution 1366 of
2001-the source of the Special Advisor's mandate.5
The task enjoys great legitimacy because of the universal recog-
nition that the Convention to Prevent and Punish the Crime of Geno-
cide of 1948 is jus cogens.6 In addition, the Outcome Report of the
2005 Summit offered a source of legitimacy to prevention of genocide
2. See id.; Press Release, Sec'y Gen., "Risk of Genocide Remains Frighteningly
Real", Sec'y Gen. Tells Human Rights Commission as He Launches Action Plan to
Prevent Genocide, U.N. Doc. SG/SM9245 (July 4, 2004),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9245.doc.htm.
3. Biographical Note, Sec'y Gen., Sec'y Gen. Appoints Francis Deng of Sudan as
Special Adviser for Prevention of Genocide, U.N. Doc. SG/A/1070 (May 29, 2007),
http://www.un.orgNewslPress/docs/2007/sgalO70.doc.htm.
4. Letter from Ban Ki-Moon, Sec'y Gen., to President of the Security Council, Se-
curity Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/721 (Dec. 7, 2007),
http://daccessdds.un.org/docUNDOC/GENN07/
633/41/PDF/N0763341.pdfopenelement.
5. S.C. Res. 1366, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1366 (Aug. 30, 2001).
6. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
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in the form of the adoption of the responsibility to protect doctrine.7
Nevertheless, sources of legal and moral support are, unfortunately,
qualified. In the case of the Genocide Convention, disputes over the
definition and about whether the facts on the ground constitute ge-
nocide have often become a substitute for serious action.8 In our ac-
tivities, we had to stress frequently that our task was to prevent, not
to adjudicate; it follows that my office was not called upon to make
such a judgment, but rather to generate action before all the ele-
ments of the definition were in place. For that reason, it was impera-
tive to act on situations of mass violence against vulnerable popula-
tions defined by their ethnicity, race, religion or national origin,
whether or not the attacks they suffered amounted to genocide, and
to let a court of law eventually decide what they amounted to. With
respect to responsibility to protect, regretfully there are now many
revisionist theories about what the relevant documents mean to say.9
Some states express distrust that responsibility to protect is just a
new code word for humanitarian intervention and, therefore, in their
view, a rationalization for super-power non-consensual interven-
tions.1o This debate last year hampered the creation of an office of
the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the responsibility to
protect, which only materialized earlier this year, and operationa-
lized the responsibility to protect doctrine: this is a clear indication
that there is still a lot to be done in the battle of ideas.11
In terms of early action, the challenge is to come up with sugges-
tions that are practical, but at the same time are not just token ges-
tures. In that sense, non-consensual military intervention should
never be ruled out absolutely because in some cases it will be the on-
7. See G.A. Res. 60/1, 138-139, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
8. See Scott Straus, Darfur and the Genocide Debate, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 123 (2005)
("[Much of the public debate in the United States and elsewhere ... has focused not
on how to stop the crisis [in Darfur], but on whether or not it should be called a 'geno-
cide' under the terms of the Genocide Convention.").
9. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerg-
ing Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 101 (2007) ("The text of the Outcome Docu-
ment of the World Summit, which is arguably the most authoritative of the ... docu-
ments [on the responsibility to protect], leaves considerable doubt concerning whether
and to what extent states intended to create a legal norm.").
10. See, e.g., Diane Maria Amann, The Course of True Human Rights Progress
Never Did Run Smooth, 21 HARv. INT'L L.J. 171, 174 (2008) ("[Sjtates sometimes have
labeled as 'humanitarian' interventions [those that are] actually undertaken for non-
altruistic reasons.").
11. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, INTERATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE
SECTION, REINVENTING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: TWO CHEERS FOR THE RESPON-
SIBILITY To PROTECT?, 2008, H.C. 08/55, at 34 ("It is... telling that anti-
interventionists pushed heavily for the Security Council to be the authorising body for
[responsibility to protect] interventions, given the ability of any of the [five permanent
members] to veto an intervention.").
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ly way to save lives. But before advocating use of force, we must be
certain that we are not going to do more harm than good, and that is
always contingent on the facts on the ground and their context. Be-
tween inaction and invasion, there exists a wide spectrum of actions
that can and should be taken on a timely basis. In my experience,
primarily on Darfur but extrapolating it to other situations as well, I
have learned that effective prevention must rely on acting simulta-
neously and in a concerted way in four areas: physical protection of
the population at risk; humanitarian relief; promoting peace talks to
end the underlying conflict; and breaking the cycle of impunity for
the crimes already committed. I stress that in each of these areas the
actions must change and be adapted to evolving circumstances. More
importantly, they should be implemented simultaneously and in
coordination with one another. We should not allow them to become a
vicious circle, like in Darfur, where each one of these actions became
so dependent on obtaining consent for the other that even four years
later they are not fully implemented. I would like to concentrate on
the fourth and last of these areas-that preventive action.
Accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity must
be comprehensive, balanced and holistic, meaning that policies and
practices must address the need to discover and disclose the truth, to
bring perpetrators to justice, to offer reparations to the victims, and
to promote deep reforms in the institutions through which State
power is exercised. In cases where the violence has clear ethnic di-
mensions, like in Darfur, they must be accompanied by reconciliation
initiatives aimed at fostering serious inter-communal conversations,
without outside interference, about return to homes and villages,
property restitution, water, grazing, and passage rights. While crim-
inal prosecutions should not be the sole response to impunity, there
is no doubt that they must play a central, indispensable role in any
policy of accountability.
Prosecutions also represent the State's fundamental obligation to
give victims access to justice. In addition, concerning international
crimes, States have a clear international legal obligation to ensure
that justice is done.12 This is particularly the case for serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law. 13 In relation to war crimes,
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I establish a
duty for States to prosecute and punish those responsible for "grave
breaches" of international humanitarian law. 14 Although it was once
understood that the category of "grave breaches" applied only to in-
ternational conflicts, a customary international law norm is emerg-
12. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 262 (2001).
13. Id. at 104.
14. Id. at 207.
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ing that also applies to conflicts not of an international character. 15 If
a State-Party is unwilling or unable to prosecute war criminals, it
must hand them over to be prosecuted by another State-Party (under
the "aut prosequi et judicare, aut dedere" principle).16 In the post
World War II era, therefore, international humanitarian law created
a new set of obligations, which in turn paved the way for the en-
forcement of these norms. 17
To foster accountability for such crimes, a dual approach should
be favored. On the one hand, the international community must pay
more attention to helping States live up to this obligation by building
independent, impartial judiciaries that can prosecute mass atrocities
with full respect for due process of law and fair trial guarantees. On
the other, our support for the International Criminal Court and other
international or hybrid criminal jurisdictions must be oriented not
only towards supplementing the absence of will or capacity to pro-
duce fair trials domestically, but also to help generate that capacity
in the near future.
In addition to the 60th Anniversary of the Genocide Convention,
we have just celebrated the 100th anniversary of the 1907 Hague
Rules, as well as the 30th anniversary of the 1977 Additional Proto-
cols to the Geneva Conventions. 18 In the seventy years that elapsed
between these two dates, 1907 and 1977, the world suffered world
wars, the Holocaust and other genocides, and many terrible war
crimes. But, these years also marked the codification of the body of
international humanitarian law, the materialization of the principle
of individual criminal responsibility at the international level, and
the strengthening of all forms of accountability for these crimes.19
The near-universal ratification of the Geneva Convention bears wit-
ness to this reinforcement of international law, and in particular of
international humanitarian law. 20
We simply have to look back less than fifteen years to see how
far we have come from the pervasiveness of impunity for grave hu-
man rights crimes and from the permissive attitude towards that
impunity by the international community. Since 1993, we have nota-
15. Id. at 247.
16. Id. at 261.
17. See id. at 260-62.
18. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1910 U.K.T.S. 9; Protocol Additional () to the Geneva Conven-
tions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of International Armed Con-
flicts Protocol, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
19. See CASSESE, supra note 12, at 245-72.
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bly witnessed the establishment of the International Criminal Tri-
bunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, and other hybrid mechanisms in East Timor, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, and recently, Lebanon and Guatemala.21 Im-
portant too are efforts to prosecute these crimes at the domestic level
in Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Rwanda, and Ethiopia.22 The creation
of the International Criminal Court in 1998 was the high point of
this evolution, signaling that accountability for war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide is now paramount. 23 However, the
Rome Statute is not only the culmination of a clear historical and
normative trend; it is also the means to establish an instrument that
makes justice possible when the national domestic jurisdictions are
unable or unwilling to afford it. 24 And yet, for each situation in which
the International Criminal Court (ICC) has acquired jurisdiction, we
hear voices calling for amnesty, withdrawal of indictments or other
forms of exercising discretion and avoiding prosecutions, supposedly
in the name of peace. 25
21. See Hervb Ascensio, The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal's Decision in Guate-
malan Generals: Unconditional Universality is Back, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 586, 586-94
(2006); Sylvia de Bertodano, Current Developments in Internationalized Courts, 1 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 226, 226-44 (2004); Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cam-
bodia, http://www.eccc.gov.kh (last visited Nov. 21, 2008); The Special Court for Sierra
Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2008); United Nations, International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, http://www.un.org/icty (last visited Nov.
21, 2008); United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
http://69.94.11.53 (last visited Nov. 21, 2008); United Nations Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/lebanon/tribunal/index.shtml (last vi-
sited Sept. 26, 2008).
22. See Alejandro E. Alvarez, Implementation of the ICC Statute in Argentina, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 480, 480-84 (2007); Stephane Bourgon, Judgments, Decisions, and
Other Relevant Materials Issued by International Courts and Other International Bo-
dies on Human Rights, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 555, 570 (2003); Comisi6n de la Verdad y
Reconciliaci6n, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ ingles/pagina0l.php (last visited Dec. 18,
2008); Justice in Perspective, National Commission on the Disappearances of Persons,
http://www.justiceinperspective.org.za/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=
74&Itemid=lll (last visited Dec. 18, 2008); Inkiko Gacaca, http://www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/index_.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2008); Justice in Perspective, Office of
the Special Prosecutor: The Special Prosecution Process of War Criminals and Human
Rights, http://www.justiceinperspective.org.za/index.php?option=comcontent&task=
view&id=14&Itemid-43) (last visited Dec. 18, 2008); The American Non-Governmental
Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court: Declarations Made by
Colombia Upon Ratification of the ICC Statute,
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Columbia-decl.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
23. See International Criminal Court, Establishment of the Court, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/ataglance/establishment.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
24. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
25. Press Release, Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda
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With the best of intentions, some are urging measures that im-
plicitly give in to the blackmail of the parties to the armed conflict:
peace can only come if those accused of atrocities are given guaran-
tees that they will not be touched.26 We are concerned by the revival
of this debate that some of us had hoped would by now be more set-
tled. To those who have followed the evolution of human rights in the
last twenty-five years, the debate rings of earlier discussions as to
whether fragile democracies could really afford to investigate and
disclose-let alone prosecute-the major crimes of the preceding
era.27 The alleged antinomy between justice and democracy, often
rephrased today as the tension between peace and justice, is debated
in academic circles and also among practitioners.28 A major confe-
rence co-organized by ICTJ was held last year in Nuremberg to dis-
cuss this tension and to explore possible ways in which peace and
justice indeed can be mutually reinforcing.29
In Northern Uganda, while there is a broad recognition that the
ICC arrest warrants have assisted in bringing the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA) to the negotiating table, some have portrayed these war-
rants as obstacles to progressing further with the peace process. 30 We
believe, however, that the warrants act as an incentive to keeping
the LRA involved in the peace talks.31 We also welcome the signature
of an Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation by the LRA
and the Government of Uganda on June 29, 2007.32 The Agreement
proposes that Uganda should implement its international obligations
to prosecute senior leaders of the LRA under national law. 33 Depend-
ing on what is proposed to implement it, and what is effectively done,
[CSOPNU], Point of No Return: Taking Stock of One Year of Cessation of Hostilities in
Northern Uganda, 2 (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.csopnu.net.
26. See id. at 3 (suggesting the United Nations Security Council suspend arrest
warrant).
27. See Charles Mango Fombad, Transitional Justice in Africa: The Experience
with Truth Commissions, May/June 2008,
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/AfricaTruthCommissions.htm (describing the
delicate transition of fragile democracies).
28. See id.
29. Press Statement, The International Center for Transnational Justice, Building
a Future on Peace and Justice (June 27, 2007), http://www.peace-justice-
conference.info/downloadlPress%20statement%2027-6-englisch_.pdf.
30. See Fombad, supra note 27 (encouraging suspension of warrants to advocate
peace).
31. See Louis Moreno-Ocampo, The Rome Statute and the ICTJ, INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE [ICTJ], May 21, 2008, http://www.ictj.org/en/news/
features/1689.htm.
32. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda-Lord's Resistance
Army/ Movement, June 29, 2007,
www.fides.org/eng/documents/ugandaagreement_290607.doc.
33. Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 31, at 1.
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we believe this course of action may be consistent with the Rome Sta-
tute. 34 A thorough national accountability process, respecting inter-
national standards, could have a wide-reaching impact in Ugandan
society. We believe the robust approach to accountability taken in
this preliminary peace agreement is an important improvement over
past peace accords, and that the pressure brought to bear by the ICC
has assisted to achieve this. That is why it is disappointing to see
that, since last June, the talks have not progressed much and the
Juba peace process may be on the brink of collapse.35 The interna-
tional community must stand ready to continue its support to the
ICC if either side reneges on the agreement.
There are many examples of the impact that prosecutions-or
even the threat of prosecutions-have in preventing crimes, includ-
ing war crimes.
In Cote d'Ivoire, the prospect of an ICC prosecution of those who
used hate speech to instigate and incite others to commit interna-
tional crimes has arguably kept those actors under some level of con-
trol.36 It is also an important example of the possible preventive role
of the ICC.37
In Colombia, alternative sentencing and demobilization of the
paramilitary groups under the Justice and Peace Law as originally
drafted would have left victims with no prospect of justice for the
harms they have suffered.38 The need to offer a semblance of com-
pliance with the international standards set forth in the Rome Sta-
tute produced important amendments during the legislative process,
then further strengthened by a Constitutional Court ruling based
precisely on the need to bring the law in line with the State's inter-
national law obligations.39 While the Justice and Peace Law, as
amended by the Constitutional Court, shows important innovations,
it also presents some tremendous challenges in dealing with large
numbers of perpetrators and victims through a system that encou-
rages cooperation with the law and disclosure as an alternative to
34. See Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda, supra note 25.
35. See U.S. Department of State, Northern Uganda Virtual Process Post, Peace
Process Chronology, July 12-31, 2008,
http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/peaceprocess.html.
36. See U.N. News Service, Statement by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide, (Nov. 15, 2004),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/printinfocusnews.asp?nid=828.
37. Id.
38. See U.S. Office on Colombia, Paramilitary Demobilization,
http://www.usofficeoncolombia.com/Paramilitary%20Demobilization (last visited Oct.
16, 2008).
39. Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia C-370/2006 (responding to a chal-
lenge to Law 975 by several civil society organizations).
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full-fledged trials. 40
In Darfur, which I visited in 2004 and 2005 in my role as Special
Advisor to the Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide, im-
punity for earlier crimes, notably the massacres of 2003 that cost
200,000 lives, has been for too long a factor of instability and a hin-
drance to prevention of future crimes.4 1 That is why, early on, I
joined those who called for a referral of the case to the ICC by the Se-
curity Council, a measure of historic significance that was adopted on
April 1, 2005.42
Unfortunately, I come away with the impression that we were
not always strategic or sufficiently persistent in pursuing a multi-
pronged approach to protection, humanitarian assistance, promoting
a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and criminal accountability. It
has now been three years since the Security Council referral to the
ICC, and the Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it does
not recognize the referral and that it will not cooperate with the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor's (OTP) investigations or the arrest warrants
issued last year against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb.43 In that
long period, the Security Council has made no effort to remind the
Government of Sudan that this was a decision adopted under Chap-
ter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and, therefore, binding
on all member States.44 Instead, we have let the regime get away
with defiance of a resolution adopted in furtherance of international
peace and security. As far as I can see, within the United Nations on-
ly the High Commissioner for Human Rights and my office of Pre-
vention of Genocide have raised this point from time to time.45 The
40. Press Release, Int'l Ctr. For Transitional Justice, Brief on Justice and Peace
Law Presented to Colombian Constitutional Court (Jan. 17, 2006),
http://www.ictj.org/images/content/2/9/296.pdf.
41. See Juan Mendez, Action is Needed to Resolve the Darfur Crisis, FIN. TIMES,
March 7, 2005, at 15.
42. See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); Mendez, supra note
41, at 15.
43. Press Release, Human Rights First, ICC Prosecutor Reports on Sudan's Ob-
structionism (Dec. 6, 2007), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/etnI/2006/alert/179;
Press Release, Int'l Crim. Ct., Warrants of Arrest for the Minister of State for Huma-
nitarian Affairs of Sudan, and a Leader of the Militia/Janjaweed (May 2, 2007),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/241.html.
44. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 42 (indicating that the Security Council acted
under Chapter VII); Press Release, Human Rights First, supra note 43. Following the
presentation of this keynote address, the President of the Security Council issued a
statement on June 16, 2008 "urg[ing] the Government of Sudan and all other parties
to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate fully with the Court, consistent with resolution
1593 (2005), in order to put an end to impunity for the crimes committed in Darfur."
Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. SIPRST/2008/21 (June
16, 2008).
45. Mendez, supra note 41.
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result is not only that we have not offered the ICC the support it
needs, but also that we have given away cards that could have been
used to reach a serious peace agreement when negotiating with
Khartoum to better protect and assist the three million Darfuris who
are now totally dependent on international assistance.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), reports of crimes are
also still surfacing. Many crimes are still being committed in a wide-
spread manner, particularly against women and girls, notably in the
Kivus.46 The fight against impunity has barely started in this huge
country. We hope that the trial at the ICC of Thomas Lubanga Dyi-
1047 will soon be followed by other cases, so as to give an account of
the many horrific crimes committed in this country since 2002.4s But
there is also an acute need in the DRC to foster accountability for the
many crimes committed before 2002.49 It is critical that domestic
courts be enabled and empowered to try those responsible, including
those bearing the highest level of responsibility. ICTJ is currently co-
undertaking a survey to better understand the extent to which
people have been victimized in the DRC.50 Another project which will
pave the way to fostering accountability in the DRC has been devel-
oped by the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
with the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Con-
go: it concerns the mapping of the serious violations of international
humanitarian law and of massive human rights violations which
have taken place in the DRC over the last few years.51 Such mapping
will not only gather and preserve crucial evidence, but also provide a
new impetus to advocate the need to bring those responsible to jus-
tice. The long-term stability of this vast country situated at the heart
of Africa is at stake, and much more needs to be done to ensure that
46. See Int'l Comm. Of the Red Cross (ICRC), Democratic Republic of Congo: Up-
date on ICRC Activities in the Kivus-January and February 2008,
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/sireengO.nsf/html/congo-kinshasa-update-060308 (last
visited Nov. 21, 2008). In the beginning of 2008, the ICRC documented many cases of
sexual violence and assault in the Kivu. Id.
47. See Mike Corder, Congo Militia Leader Ordered to Stand Trial, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/01/30/
congo-militialeaderorderedtostandtrial; see also Emma Thomasson, Global Court
Ready for First Trial of Congo Suspect, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2007/O1/29/AR2007012901620
.html.
48. See David Scheffer & John Prendergast, Op-Ed., Commentary: A Deadly Cock-
tail Devastates Congo, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2000, at B9.
49. See id.
50. International Center for Transitional Justice, The Democratic Republic of the
Congo, http:/www.ictj.org/en/where/regionl/646.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
51. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
HIGH COMMISSIONER'S STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN 2008-2009, at 59 (2008)
http://www.ohchr.orgtDocuments/AboutUs/SMP2008-2009.pdf.
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the plight of the Congolese is addressed in accountability terms.
Ultimately, all these cases demonstrate that the interests of jus-
tice and peace cannot and should not be divorced. Justice is an im-
portant component of the prevention of future crimes. It is only
through justice and enforcement of the law that long-term respect for
the rule of law can be built.
This provides us with an important lesson for all international
and hybrid jurisdictions: they must seek more pro-actively to build
their legitimacy in affected regions, so as to build their own relevance
in the lives of those most affected. Most importantly, these jurisdic-
tions are judged on the basis of their impartiality and professional-
ism. To be seen as legitimate and respectful of universal standards,
any perception of selective prosecution, not based on rational choices,
should be avoided or at least carefully explained.
Those of us who support these jurisdictions should learn to iden-
tify their impact and successes in ways that go beyond the strict con-
fines of the judicial process. In cases such as Cambodia, this will de-
pend on the legitimacy and transparency of the Extraordinary
Chambers in the eyes of Cambodians who suffered under the Khmer
Rouge and the international community.52 This broader impact is all
the more important for those international or hybrid jurisdictions
which are being prompted to "complete" their work in the coming
years.53 It is time to assess their work, but we must do it under a
long-term view and not on the basis of their immediate political effect
on the ground. It is important to review their legacy and what re-
mains to be done, with a view to help generate incorporation and
ownership of that legacy by the national legal culture, and domestic
capacity to further their work.
Of paramount importance is to bring to justice the leaders who
bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of international
crimes. Even heads of States are not beyond the reach of the law.
These principles are reflected throughout international humanita-
rian law, the rule on command responsibility, and in the fact that the
official position of individuals does not relieve them of criminal re-
sponsibility. 54
Of essential importance too is the need to continue to support
domestic actors as they seek to bring justice outside of the spotlight
of international attention or through the United Nations. In this re-
52. Id. at 70.
53. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES: MAXIMIZING THE LEGACY OF HYBRID
COURTS 16 (2008), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/PublicationsHybridCourts.pdf.
54. See Theodor Meron, The Humanizaztion of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 239, 243 (2000) (discussing the shift from "state-to-state aspects of international
humanitarian law to individual criminal responsibility").
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spect I want to mention again important efforts in places such as Pe-
ru and Argentina, as well as the ground-breaking precedent estab-
lished by the Supreme Court of Chile in ruling in favor of the extradi-
tion of former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori.55
The conduct of modern wars affects greater numbers of innocent
victims than ever before, and so also greater than ever is the impor-
tance of condemning breaches of international humanitarian law and
crimes against humanity and finding ways to enforce these norms.
But one must recognize that preventing violations of international
humanitarian law is an ideal which may never be fully attained. Jus-
tice, accountability, and punishment play important preventive func-
tions, but they should not be overestimated. The fact that murders
have been prosecuted domestically for centuries has not resulted in
the cessation of murders. The fear that individuals have of being pos-
sibly punished may have a deterrent effect if it is correlated with the
likelihood of being punished. And this may be one of the fundamental
problems of international justice: it is not yet systematic, and there
are still too many ways to escape it. This in turn shows the impor-
tance of the complementary approach: the need to foster accountabil-
ity at both the domestic and the international levels so that they ul-
timately reinforce each other.
Thank you very much for your attention.
55. Chile: Fujimori Can Be Extradited, CNN.coM, Sept. 21, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/americas/09/21/chile.fujimori/index.html?iref=news
search.
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